DOE Opens $100 Million for the Utilities That Struggle Most With Cyber Defense
ENMG Analysis
On October 1, the U.S. Department of Energy announced its intent to fund $100 million in advanced cybersecurity technical assistance for electric cooperatives, municipal utilities, and small investor-owned utilities. The opportunity is designed to address a practical weakness in the electric sector: many of the utilities serving rural communities and smaller cities have critical operating responsibilities but lack the staff, capital, and specialized expertise available to larger power companies.
The funding will flow through the Rural and Municipal Utility Cybersecurity Advanced Cybersecurity Technical Assistance Partnership Intermediary Agreement, or RMUC Advanced Cybersecurity TA PIA. It is important to understand what that structure means. This is not a direct grant program distributing $100 million to individual co-ops or municipal utilities. Instead, DOE’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, known as CESER, intends to fund not-for-profit intermediary organizations that will deliver cybersecurity tools, services, training, threat information sharing, and technical assistance to eligible utilities.
Applicants must demonstrate formal partnerships with at least six qualifying electric utilities and show how they will deliver meaningful, measurable improvements across those participants. The DOE announced funding opportunity identifies potential activities including cybersecurity assessments, workforce training and certification, readiness exercises, technology implementation, verification and validation, and threat information-sharing programs.
The opportunity is being administered by ConnectWerx in partnership with DOE through a Partnership Intermediary Agreement. ConnectWerx’s solicitation identifies October 20, 2026, at 2 p.m. Eastern time as the application deadline for eligible not-for-profit organizations.
Why small utility cybersecurity requires a different approach
Small utility cybersecurity involves many of the same threats faced by larger utilities, including credential theft, ransomware, supply-chain compromise, phishing, unauthorized remote access and attacks on industrial control systems.
Their challenge is structural. A large investor-owned utility may have dedicated information technology security teams, operational technology specialists, security operations centers, compliance personnel, incident-response contractors, and capital budgets for continuous monitoring. A small municipal utility or electric cooperative may rely on a handful of employees who divide their time among engineering, field operations, billing systems, telecommunications, regulatory requirements, and emergency response.
Electric cooperatives and municipal utilities also often serve large geographic areas with relatively low customer density. That can limit the amount of rate-based revenue available for security investments. A utility responsible for substations, distribution automation, communications networks, and control systems across hundreds or thousands of square miles may not have the same financial capacity as a densely populated utility serving a major metropolitan area.
The result is not a lack of operational importance. The bulk power system is interconnected, and distribution utilities remain part of the chain that moves electricity from generation and transmission assets to customers, hospitals, manufacturers, water systems, farms, and communications networks. A cyber incident at a smaller operator may be geographically limited, but it can also disrupt critical local services or create coordination problems during a broader grid emergency.
That is why CESER Director Andrew McClure said, “Resource-constrained operators face unique challenges in accessing cybersecurity tools, expertise, and information.” He added that DOE wants to close the capability gap through hands-on support, threat information sharing, and system-hardening resources.
The difference between IT and OT security
The technical assistance opportunity is relevant to both information technology and operational technology, but the distinction matters.
Information technology generally includes business systems such as email, financial software, customer-service platforms, employee devices, and data-storage systems. IT security typically focuses on protecting information, accounts, networks, and applications.
Operational technology controls physical processes. In an electric utility, OT can include supervisory control and data acquisition systems, substation equipment, protective relays, remote terminal units, distributed energy resource controls, communications systems, and other technologies used to monitor or operate the grid.
Some business IT systems can be patched, isolated, or temporarily taken offline without immediately affecting physical operations. Utility IT systems that support identity, communications, outage management or operational coordination may be much harder to interrupt. OT systems are harder to retrofit because they may need to operate continuously, interact with equipment from multiple vendors, and meet strict requirements for availability and safety. A software update that is routine in an office environment may require extensive testing in a substation or control center.
Older equipment adds another layer of difficulty. Some systems were designed before today’s networked environment and may have limited authentication, logging, encryption, or remote-management capabilities. Replacing them can be expensive, while connecting them to newer monitoring and security tools can create interoperability and reliability concerns.

For that reason, effective OT cybersecurity is not simply an IT procurement exercise. It requires coordination among system operators, engineers, field technicians, telecommunications personnel, vendors, and executive leadership. It also requires careful attention to manual operating procedures and backup communications if digital systems become unavailable.
What the $100 million opportunity can support
The RMUC TA PIA allows applicants to propose support under two broad areas: system hardening and technical assistance, and cybersecurity threat information sharing.
Potential assistance includes:
- Cybersecurity assessments and gap analysis
- Cybersecurity planning and road maps
- Workforce training and professional certification
- Incident-response and business-continuity planning
- Tabletop exercises and operational readiness drills
- Implementation and integration of cybersecurity tools
- Verification and validation after new controls are deployed
- Threat intelligence and information-sharing activities
- Other services that produce measurable improvements in resilience
This structure could help utilities move from general awareness to documented progress. A utility might begin with an inventory of its IT and OT assets, identify how systems connect, establish priorities, and then receive assistance implementing network segmentation, access controls, monitoring, backup procedures, or secure remote access.
Training is equally important. Cybersecurity systems do not create resilience if utility personnel do not know how to interpret alerts, isolate affected equipment, communicate during an incident, or restore operations safely. Exercises can expose gaps before a real event forces employees to make those decisions under pressure.
Threat information sharing may also provide value that individual utilities could not create independently. A small utility may not have the personnel to monitor the threat environment continuously, analyze indicators, or maintain relationships with multiple information-sharing organizations. A shared service or intermediary can spread those capabilities across a larger group of participants.
The benefits and limitations of an intermediary model
DOE’s use of a PIA is intended to reach organizations and utilities that may be difficult to serve through a conventional federal contracting process. According to DOE’s explanation of Partnership Intermediary Agreements, the mechanism is designed to expand engagement with nontraditional partners and provide a more flexible way to support technology deployment and collaboration.
The model may reduce administrative barriers for participating utilities because a not-for-profit organization can coordinate assessments, vendors, training, and shared services across multiple operators. The six-utility partnership threshold also encourages applicants to demonstrate an existing network rather than proposing assistance without confirmed utility participation.
There are tradeoffs. Intermediaries must manage sensitive utility information, coordinate different technology environments, and demonstrate that assistance produces meaningful outcomes rather than a series of reports or one-time workshops. Utilities will still need internal personnel to maintain systems, apply lessons from training, update procedures, and sustain improvements after the period of assistance ends.
The $100 million figure should also be kept in perspective. It is significant for a technical assistance initiative, but small relative to the cybersecurity needs of the nation’s electric infrastructure. Cybersecurity is a continuous operating cost, not a one-time purchase. Software licenses expire, equipment ages, personnel change, new vulnerabilities emerge, and threat actors adapt.
The opportunity can help establish a baseline, improve defenses, and expand access to specialized expertise. It cannot eliminate the need for long-term utility investment, mutual assistance, vendor accountability, workforce development, and sustained federal and state coordination.
Cybersecurity is part of grid reliability
The relationship between cybersecurity and reliability is becoming more visible as utilities manage more digital controls, distributed resources, advanced meters, automated switching, and communications-dependent operations. The same grid modernization push behind DOE’s SPARK program that seeks to improve transmission capacity and system flexibility also increases the importance of securing the digital systems that operate and monitor the grid.
Federal support for small utilities should therefore be viewed alongside broader reliability planning. During periods of extreme demand or system stress, utilities may need to coordinate closely with regional transmission organizations, balancing authorities, neighboring utilities, and government agencies. Recent coverage of the DOE’s emergency grid orders illustrates how quickly operational coordination can become essential when the power system is under pressure.
The next step is the selection process. Interested not-for-profit organizations must meet the eligibility requirements, document formal partnerships with at least six qualifying utilities, and present a credible plan for measurable cybersecurity improvements. Readers should watch for selected performers, the number and geographic distribution of participating utilities, the technologies and services ultimately deployed, and the metrics used to evaluate progress.
For small utilities, the most important question will be whether the program produces durable capability. Assistance will matter most when it leaves operators with stronger procedures, trained personnel, tested response plans, better visibility into their systems, and security controls that can be maintained after federal support ends.
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